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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR GRAHAM, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
and Cross-Apellant, 
vs. 
EVAN E. STREET and MAX 
SIEGEL, 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, ARTHUR GRAHAM 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT 
In this brief, the respondent and cross-appellant, Arthur 
Graham, will be called the plaintiff, and the appellants and 
cross-respondents will be called the defendants. 
Inasmuch as there was a former appeal herein concern-
ing the Interlocutory Decree (Rec. 89-91) the plaintiff will 
proceed in this brief in accordance with the rule laid down 
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in the case of Silva v. Pickard, et. al., 14 Utah, 245, 47 Pac. 
144, which states: 
The court cannot recall the case, and reverse its de-
cision, after the remittitur is issued. It has deter-
mined the principles of law which shall govern, and, 
having thus determined, its jurisdiction in that re-
spect is gone. Young v. Frost, 1 Md. 304; McClellan 
v. Crook, 7 Gill, 338; Leese v. Clark, 20 Cal. 417; 
Hayne, New Trial & App. No. 291. 
This being so, the former appeal establishes the foll-
owing as 
THE LAW OF THE CASE. 
1. That a partnership was entered into by Arthur 
Graham, plaintiff herein, and Evan E. Street, defendant 
herein, on August 6th, 1943, to be known by the name and 
style of Graham & Street, and that said partnership has 
since that date existed and does now exist and has not at 
any time been dissolved. (Rec. 87, par. 14; Rec. 89, par. 1.) 
(Rec. 82, par 5.) 
2. That the partnership capital assets at its inception 
consisted of the following described property: 
One (1) RD 7 Caterpiller Tractor, No. 9G1531SP 
One (1) LeTourneau Angle Dozer, or Bull Dozer 
One. (1) Model M Two drum Le Tourneau Power 
controlled unit. 
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One (1) Scarrifier. 
(Rec. 82, par. 4; Rec. 89, par 2.) 
3. That on August 6th, 1943 the defendant, Max Siegel, 
loaned the partnership the sum of $4,500.00, and he took 
blank notes and mortgages from the co-partners and re-
ceived a bill of sale from the Bothwell Construction Comp-
any for the above equipment listed in item 2 above to secure 
the payment of the said sum of $4,500.00, due one year 
after date with interest at 9% per annum, and thereby 
became a mortgagee of the partnership capital assets. (Rec. 
82-84, par 6.) Other property was also given as security in 
addition to the above listed property. 
4. That on or about September 22nd, 1943, defendant, 
Siegel, told .Plaintiff that he, Siegel, was the sole owner of 
the said partnership capital assets. (Rec. 85, par 9.) 
5. That on September 29th, 1943, defendant, Siegel, 
wrote a letter to plaintiff returning his additional security 
and sta tin~: 
"In August you left in our office a title to your 1939 
Ford Pickup, Motor No. 4833047. This was at the 
time when you, Mr. Street and myself were discuss-
ing the advisability of my purchasing a caterpillar 
from Mr. Bothwell so that the three of us could 
enter into an agreement to operate this caterpillar. 
"Since you did not come in as you agreed to enter 
into a contract for the operation of the caterpillar 
which I bought, I am returning the above mentioned 
title to you with this letter." 
(Rec. 85, par. 10: Plaintiff's Exhibit C.) 
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6. That plaintiff was a partner in the partnership of 
Clyde, Probst & Graham, which was, prior to the entering 
into the partnership of Graham & Street, operating an ex-
cavating and other business with tractors, bulldozers and 
road graders in connection therewith, in and about Ameri-
can Fork, Utah. (Rec. 81, par 1.) 
7. That defendant, Evan E. Street, was an employee of 
the firm of Clyde, Probst & Graham prior to the making 
of the partnership agreement of Graham & Street. (Rec. 
81, par. 2.) 
8. That plaintiff turned over to the partnership of 
Graham & Street the business theretofore operated by 
Clyde, Probst & Graham, and the contracts for work which 
were being performed by said co-partnership. (Rec. 81, 
par. 3; Rec. 82, par. 5.) 
9. "That from and since August 23rd, 1943, the de-
fendants have conspired to take possession of the partner-
ship property of Graham & Street, to collect and mis-appro-
priate the funds earned in the operation of the equipment on 
the contracts of Graham & Street, and to exclude plaintiff 
from any management or control of said partnership busi-
ness, and have continued to operate the said partnership 
equipment and business until January 12th, 1945, collect all 
monies from the operation thereof and appropriate said 
monies to their own use." (NOTE: The property of the 
partnership of Graham & Street consisted of that listed in 
item 2 above, and the contracts which were turned over to 
the said partnership by the plaintiff which were originally 
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owned by Clyde, Probst and Graham. The business con-
sisted of the going operation which existed prior to the 
formation of the partnership of Graham and Street.) 
(Rec. 86, par 11.) (NOTE: The date of August 23rd is 
set from Plaintiff's Exhibit G.) 
10. That on or about the 12th day of January, 1945, 
the said defendant, Max Siegel, with the consent of the 
defendant, Evan E. Street, but without the consent or 
knowledge of the plaintiff, sold all of the partnership equip-
ment hereinabove set forth to Roberts & Ferguson, of Utah 
County, Utah, for the sum of Six Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($6,500.00) ." (NOTE: The sale included for the 
price which was received a conveyor loader and pickup 
truck which are not listed as assets in item 2 above. Siegel 
paid $2,000.00 for the items not listed.) (Rec. 86, par. 11; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit I.) 
11. That the monies paid to Max Siegel by the Ohran 
Construction Company and the final payment representing 
the suit of Evan Street against the said Construction Comp-
any being Civil No. 13049 in evidence herein, were monies 
due to the firm of Graham & Street. (Rec. 86, par 12.) 
12. That subsequent to August 23rd, 1943, the defend-
ant, Max Siegel, has collected all monies earned in the oper-
ation of said equipment, and has retained all of the profits 
of the operation of the said equipment and partnership 
business. (Rec. 86, par 13.) 
13. That the defendent, Evan E. Street, operated the 
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said equipment from August 16th, 1943, until January 12th, 
1945 (Rec. 86, par. 13), and that said defendant, Max 
Siegel, still retains monies belonging to the said Evan E. 
Street from the agreement of conspiracy between them, 
pending the outcome of this action. (Rec. 86-87, par. 13.) 
14. That plaintiff has never relinquished any interest 
in the partnership of Graham & Street, nor the property 
belonging to said partnership. (Rec. 87, par. 14.) 
15. That the note given the mortgagee, Siegel, has 
never been paid, and the mortgage given to secure said note 
has never been foreclosed. (Rec. 87, par. 15.) 
16. That plaintiff has requested the defendents and 
each of them to cease to collect money belonging to the 
partnership, and misappropriate the same to their own use, 
and to deposit the money heretofore collected by them in 
the partnership account of Graham & Street, and that said 
defendants and each of them have heretofore neglected and 
refused, and yet do neglect and refuse to account for the 
money collected, and do continue to conspire between them-
selves in order to deprive the plaintiff of his rightful interest 
in the money belonging to the said partnership from the 
operation OF THE PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS AND THE 
SALE OF THE PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY; (Rec. 87, 
par. 16.) 
17. That by a sale of the partnership property, DE 
FENDANTS HAVE DEPRIVED THE PARTNERSHIP OF 
THE REASONABLE EARNINGS OF THE PARTNER-
6 
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SHIP PROPPERTY. (Rec. 87, par. 16.) 
18. That there is now due and owing to Max Siegel on 
the promissory note set forth in item 3 above, (Rec. 87, par. 
177; Rec. 88, par 4), the sum of $4,500.00 plus interest at 
9% per annum from and after August 6th, 1943. 
19. As a conclusion of law from the foregoing matters, 
the lower court and this supreme court held that "the 
plaintiff is entitled to an interlocutory decree of this court 
requiring the defendants, and each of them, to account for 
all monies which they have collected from the operation 
OF THE PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS AND EQUIPMENT 
AND EQUIPMENT PURCHASED TO BE USED IN 
CONNECTION THEREWITH, and for all reasonable pro-
fits from which the partnership has been deprived by reason 
of the unauthorized and wrongful sale of the partnership 
capital assets. (Rec. 87-88, par. 2) 
20. That this (district) court retain jurisdiction in 
this cause to settle all accounts between the parties hereto, 
to dissolve the partnership of Graham & Street, and to make 
such further orders, judgments and decrees as may be just 
and equitable in the premises, to the end that a full and 
complete settlement of the entire controversy existing be-
tween and among the parties shall be made. (Rec. 90, 
par. 6.) 
21. That the defendants and each of them be required 
to file an account of the matters set forth in the Interlocu-
tory Decree (Rec. 89-90) . 
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The above are matters taken from the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and the Interlocutory Decree (Rec. 81-
91.) In addition to these, the following are taken from the 
opinion of this supreme court appearing in 166 P. 2d 524, 
and in the Record from 438 to 442; which are quoted as 
follows: 
22. "This is an action in equity to have declared by 
decree the partnership between Graham and Street; to have 
the alleged conduct of Siegel treating himself as owner de-
clared as fraudulent; and to make Siegel account for that 
property or the proceeds thereof as GrahamStreet partner-
ship property and for an accounting as to profits therefrom 
while it was controlled by Siegel conniving with the allegedly 
faithless Street." (Emphasis ours. Opinion of this court 
page 4, next to last paragraph on page, Rec. back of page 
439.) This is the basis of the accounting which should be 
made, by the defendant Siegel. 
23. "Odly enough, the defendants do not assign as error 
the finding No. 11 that 'defendants have conspired to take 
possession of the partnership property of Graham and 
Street, TO COLLECT AND MISAPPROPRIATE THE 
FUNDS EARNED IN THE OPERATION OF THE EQUIP-
MENT ON THE CONTRACTS OF GRAHAM & STREET, 
and to exclude plaintiff from the management or controll of 
said partnership business, and have continued to operate 
the said partnership equipment and business until January 
12th, 1945, collect all monies from the operation thereof 
8 
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and appropriate said monies to their own use.'" (Emphasis 
ours. Opinion of this court page 6, third paragraph, Rec. 
back of page 440.) 
24. "The fraud consists in Siegel using his title as a 
lever to exact more from Graham than the interest agreed 
upon and that for such purpose he either took the title with 
a secret intention of so doing, or, after taking title for se-
curity purposes only, later conceived of the scheme to use 
it for such exaction, and not succeeding in getting Graham 
to agree to a modification of what was a loan agreement 
he then used his title in connivance with Street to divert 
what was in reality Graham-Street equipment charged with 
a loan from that partnership, TO IDS OWN PURPOSES." 
(Emphasis ours. Opinion of this court, page 4, near end 
of first paragraph, Rec. back of page 439.) 
25. "Street did not notify Graham that the partnership 
was at an end." (Rec. 442.) 
26. "In this case Street used property belonging to 
the partnership, treating it as belonging to Siegel, refrusing 
to account to Graham for the monies collected for the use 
of the tractor, but the property will in equity be cons:dered 
as being used for the benefit of the Graham-Street partner-
ship and accounting of profits required to be made to this 
partnership." This is the measure of the account of Street 
only and does not include any accounting for Siegel in con-
nection with the partnership. (Rec. 442.) 
Subsequent to the handing down of the remittitur on 
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July 29th, 1946, in case No. 6863 in this court (Rec. 434), 
the following matters took place: 
Order for Accounting (Rec. 432). 
Accounting of Max Siegel (Rec. 6-7) Filed Septem-
ber 3rd, 1946. 
Account of Defendant Evan Street (Rec. 8-16) Filed 
September 3rd, 1946. 
Objections to Accountings by Defendants and Supple-
mental Complaint (Rec. 17 -22) Filed September 12th, 1946. 
In this pleading, plaintiff alleges that the accounts do not 
comply with the Interlocutory Decree of the lower court 
upheld by this court, for the reasons therein stated; sets up 
that had the defendants been skilled in the operation of the 
partnership equipment that they would have made in ex-
cess of the rental value thereof; that plaintiff was skilled in 
the management of the business of said partnership, and 
"by the fraudulent acts of the defendants he was deprived 
of the management of said business, and of profits there-
from which would have exceeded the fair, actual and rea-
sonable rental value of the equipment used in the operation 
of the partnership business;" sets up the rental value of 
all equipment used in the controversy, and the extent to 
which the partnership of GRAHAM & STREET has been 
damaged by the fraudulent taking of such equipment; 
sets up the damage sustained by the fraudulent taking 
of the business of the partnership of GRAHAM & STREET 
as to profits to be derived after the conversion of such bus-
10 
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iness; and prays that the accountings of defendants be re-
jected, that damages be allowed to the PARTNERSHIP OF 
GRAHAM AND STREET in the amounts therein set forth; 
that the partnership be dissolved after settlement of the 
accounts; that in the terminating of the affairs of the part-
nership of Graham and Street, that the plaintiff be allowed 
$5,000.00 as attorney's fees for maintaining and establish-
ing the partnership; that after paying such attorney's fees 
that the property of the partnership be distributed in accord-
ance with the partnership agreement; that punitive dam-
ages be assessed; that costs be recovered by plaintiff; and 
that general relief be granted to plaintiff. 
Motions to strike and demurrers were filed by each de-
fendant separately, (Rec. 23-43) and upon the overruling 
of these motions and demurrers, the defendants f:Ied original 
mandamus proceedings in this court, being case No. 7045 
herein, the remittitur in said case being dated April 19th, 
1948, (Rec. 451-455) in which this court, as the further 
law of the case, stated: 
Up to the time of the entry of the interlocutory de-
cree the only issues which had been tr:ed were those 
necessary to determine whether or not plaintiffs 
were liable to Graham on any basis, i. e., whether 
or not Graham was entitled to any relief of any kind 
as against plaintiffs. The issues there involved were 
whether or not a partnership ever existed betwee::-1 
Graham and Street; whether or not such partnership 
had ever been terminated, and if so, when; whether 
or not Siegel was a proper party defendant in that 
action; and certain procedural questions not ncccss-
11 
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ary to be noticed here. Evidence as to partnership 
profits, and as to other similar matters was carefully 
excluded. It was apparently the purpose of defend-
ant court, and of the parties to that action, to deter-
mine first whether or not Graham was entitled to 
any relief against plaintiffs. If it should be found 
that a partnership existed, and that plaintiffs had 
been guilty of the wrong-doing alleged by Graham, 
then a second trial or inquiry should be had for the 
purpose of determining the relief to which Graham 
should be entitled. When we entertained the appeal 
from the interlocutory decree we had before us only 
those matters which had been litigated by defendant 
court. The question of what relief Graham was en-
titled to was not before us. Any expressions of opin-
ion by us as to what relief Graham was entitled to 
were mere dicta-not the law of the case and not 
binding either upon us or upon defendant court. 
By the terms of the interlocutory decree affirmed by 
us, defendant court retained jurisdiction of the case 
to settle all accounts between the parties, to dissolve 
the partnership and to make such further orders, 
judgments, and decrees as might be just and equit-
able. We affirmed the decree unconditionally, and 
without modification. 
How then can it be argued that by our decree of 
affirmance we foreclosed the defendant court from 
entertaining any amendments to the pleading necess-
ary to bring about an equitable result? By affirm-
ing the order requiring plaintiffs to account for the 
profits and partnership assets, we did not thereby 
preclude the court from making a supplementary 
order requiring an account on a different basis, if it 
should deem such necessary to accomplish an equit-
able result. By our decree of affirmance we said in 
substance to the defendant court: "We have exam-
12 
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ined into all of the issues thus far determined by you, 
and find that you have decided them all correctly. 
There has been no error thus far. You may proceed." 
We did not tell the court in what manner it should 
proceed. We did not lay down a course to follow. 
We merely remitted the cause to defendant court to 
be disposed of in accordance with the principles of 
equity jurisprudence. By refusing to grant plain-
tiff's motion to strike, the defendant court violated 
neither the letter nor the spirit of our mandate." 
(Rec. 454). (191 P 2d. 153). 
After the return of the remittitur in said action No. 
7045 in this supreme court, the defendants each filed ans-
wers to the objections to accounting and supplemental 
complaint (Rec. 44-68). 
To the answers last above set forth, the plaintiff filed 
motions to strike and demurrers, which were denied and 
overruled in part and partly granted and sustained. (Rec. 
69-74.) 
Plaintiff filed replies to the answers to the supplemen-
tal complaints (Rec. 74-78). 
Issues were joined on the pleadings thus filed and the 
court filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree (Rec. 115-122.) 
It is from these latter Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Decree that both plaintiff and defendants have 
appealed. 
Plaintiff will refer to the facts as he makes his argu-
ment in this brief. Suffice it to say now that the plaintiff 
13 
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objects to the statements of fact made by each of the 
defendants and especially calls attention to one false state-
ment of fact in the brief of Max Siegel, at the bottom of 
page 10 and the top of page 11 of his brief. Speaking of 
the partnership equipment (Rec. 82, par. 4; Rec. 89, par. 2) 
this statement is made: "It was sold January 12, 1945, by 
MR. STREET, before he joined the Navy, for the agreed 
price of $4,500.00, and this amount charged to Mr. Siegel in 
the account (54)". Finding 11 of the original findings, 
(Rec. 86) is the law of the case that MAX SIEGEL sold this 
equipment to Roberts and Ferguson. 
In examining both of the briefs of defendants herein, 
they base their entire arguments on the premise that this 
action is for a partnership accounting, and that the only 
measure of account is an accounting in the settlement of 
the partnership affairs and that nothing else is to be done. 
If this premise falls, and is contrary to the law of the 
case, a portion of which is above quoted, their whole argu-
ment falls with it and their briefs are sham, redundant, and 
of no value whatsoever in presenting to this court the true 
situation upon which the accounting should be based. 
It is to be noted further, that the trial court based its 
judgment on the statement in the memorandum decision 
(Rec. 475-488) upon the premise that "the use of the part-
nership assets, and the conduct of the partnership business, 
were carried on by Street assisted by Siegel, with reasonable 
diligence, with one exception." Fashioning the findings and 
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decree (Rec. 115-122) around this holding, the court pro-
ceeded with a so-called partnership accounting, and by so 
doing did not follow the law of the case, nor the mandate 
of this supreme court in the appeal from the interlocutory 
decree (Rec. 438-442) and the mandamus proceedings here-
tofore had herein (Rec. 452-454). 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
I. 
The district court failed to follow the law of the case 
established by the supreme court in the appeal from the 
interlocutory decree heretofore entered herein. 
A. The contention of defendants and the findings of 
the court that the action was for a partnership accounting 
only is contrary to the law of the case. 
B. The purported accountings filed by the defendants 
were not in accordance with the interlocutory decree on 
file herein, and are contrary to the law of the case, inas-
much as the defendant, Max Siegel, was not a partner in 
the partnership of Graham and Street and is not entitled 
to defend and account in this action as a partner, and for 
the further reason that both defendants in their original 
answers and in the first trial herein repudiated the ex'st-
ence of a partnership and are now estopped from asking re-
lief on the basis of a partnership agreement which they 
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n. 
The proper measure of accounting in this action is 
judgment for the value of the equipment taken at the time 
of the taking, for damages for the value of the use thereof, 
for the value of the contracts of the partnership appropriat-
ed by Siegel to his own use, for damages for disrupting the 
partnership business, and for exemplary damages. 
A. The proper measure of accounting in this action 
for the unlawful taking of the equipment by Siegel is the 
value of the equipment taken at the time of taking. 
B. The proper measure of accounting in this action for 
the detention of the equipment by the defendant, Siegel, is 
the rental value thereof while so detained by Siegel. 
C. The proper measure of accounting in this action for 
the fraudulent appropriation of the partnership contracts 
by Siegel to his own use is the total receipts received by 
him on these contracts. 
D. The defendants should account to the partnership 
for damages caused for disrupting the partnership business. 
E. The partnership should be allowed exemplary dam-
ages for the fraud of the defendants. 
m. 
It was error for the lower court to allow Max Siegel 
rental value for the conveyor-loader. 
IV. 
The plaintiff proved all of the allegations of his supple-
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mental complaint and should have been awarded judgment 
in accordance therewith. 
v. 
The lower court failed to follow the mandate of the su-
preme court in the appeal from the Interlocutory Decree 
heretofore entered herein that the defendants should not be 
allowed to profit from their own wrong. 
VI. 
The judgement entered on July 12th, 1952, herein does 
not make the plaintiff, Graham, whole. 
ARGUMENT 
We now come to the argument in this case and as the 
first point stated in "PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF 
POINTS," (Rec. 500-501) the following is set forth: 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE 
LAW OF THE CASE ESTABLISHED BY THE SUPREME 
COURT IN THE APPEAL FROM THE INTERLOCUTORY 
DECREE HERETOFORE ENTERED HEREIN. 
A 
THE CONTENTION OF DEFENDANTS AND THE 
FINDINGS OF THE COURT THAT THE ACTION WAS 
FOR A PARTNERSHIP ACCOUNTING ONLY IS CON-
TRARY TO THE LAW OF THE CASE. 
It is interesting to note that the defendants in their 
17 
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brief on the original appeal from the Interlocutory Decree, 
used as their first argument the following: 
"THE AMENDED COMPLAINT INTRODUCED A 
NEW CAUSE OF ACTION OTHER THAN AND 
DIFFERENT FROM THE ORIGINAL CAUSE OF 
ACTION." (Brief, page 6.) 
Going on to argue this premise, on pages 7 and 8, the 
brief states: 
Section 104-14-3, U. C. A. 1943 permits amendments 
to pleadings. But a new or different cause of action 
may not be alleged under the guise of an amend-
ment. 
:1(: * * * 
The original cause of action was an equitable 
action by one partner seeking an account for partner-
ship moneys and property received by the other 
partner. The amended complaint sought to add to 
this as against the defendant Street another cause of 
action for damages for conspiring to take over the 
partnership assets. And in addition, against the de-
fendant Siegel for damages for such a conspiracy, 
and also to adjudicate as against the defendant Street 
(this should be Siegel) that a contract of purchase 
which he had made with Bothwell Construction Com-
pany was in fact a loan to the alleged partnership. 
The defendants could not have stated the purpose of 
the amended complaint in a clearer fashion. They have 
now reversed themselves and their whole contention in this 
appeal is that there is only one theory of recovery in this 
matter and that is for an accounting within the partnership. 
18 
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This supreme court in discussing the above argument 
(Rec. 438) states: 
While the original complaint contained a vague re-
ference to a conspiracy between Street and third 
parties as shown by the above italicized portion, the 
new matter we think is more than a mere elaboration 
of this vague charge of conspiracy because it definite-
ly names Siegel as the outside conspiring party and 
guiding genius of Street in his alleged departure from 
the conduct expected from one related to another in 
trust and confidence. The gravamen of the offense 
is shifted from one in the original complaint of a 
recalcitrant partner who will not account and who, 
with the assistance of others, uses partnership pro-
perty for other than partnership use, to one where 
the material part of the offense is the defrauding of 
Graham by the connivance of Street and Siegel in 
which the partnership of Graham and Street is a pre-
liminary issue. (Rec. 438, pages 1 and 2 of opinion.) 
The second argument used by defendants in their br~ef 
ort the first appeal was: 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO JOIN 
SIEGEL AS A PARTY DEFENDANT. 
In discussing this matter, this supreme court, on pages 
2 and 3 of its opinion (Rec. 438-439) states: 
We think the amended complaint, when the history 
of the transactions somewhat narratively stated is 
considered, sets forth an action in equity, the, very 
core of which is the fraudulent action of the defend-
ants Street and Siegel in conniving to undo a part-
nership between Graham and Street and to keep from 
Graham the property and fruits of his alleged part-
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nership with Street. The allegations of plaintiff's 
partnership with Street are necessary and prelimin-
ary to arrive at the part that Siegel and Street played 
in disrupting the relationship of Graham and Street. 
Even if the amended complaint be thought of as 
embracing two causes of action, one to declare the 
existence of a partnership between Graham and 
Street and for an accounting by Street in respect 
to that partnership, and the other sounding in fraud 
to determine the legal and equitable status of the 
"cat" and to make Siegel account for his alleged 
participation in wrongfully diverting and withholding 
the property and earnings of the Graham-Street part-
nership, the two are so bound and interrelated that 
it would seem difficult to separate them. If it were 
possible to separate them and Graham had brought 
one action against Street and another action contem-
poraneously against Street and Siegel, the court, in 
the interest of practicable and economic procedure, 
would have had to consolidate them if indeed they 
may not have been considered as brought under Sec. 
104-7-3, subd. 1, U.C.A. 1943, even though not separ-
ately stated. For the very reason that the successive 
transactions are so related and so blended into each 
other that they form one whole and complete episode, 
such separation would be difficult to accomplish. It 
is natural and logical to conceive of the complaint 
as constructed about the central transactions where-
by Siegel allegedly insinuated himself in the Graham 
and Street relationship and look at the other allega-
tions as matters leading up to or away from the 
central scheme. It is not required that a series of 
transactions so closely related in time and fact as to 
produce a substantial cause and effect transition be 
grouped and compartmentalized so as to fall into 
designated types of legal actions. The law serves life. 
Reformed pleading unlike that of common law is not 
a straight-jacket which allows of no freedom of 
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l 
movement. Life and the books are replete with 
cases where the alleged wrong emanates or evolves 
from a series of related transactions in which various 
actors have played varying parts with varying de-
grees of guilt or delict. The wrong chosen from the 
whole of the facts as a basis for the action is none-
theless so because a separation and grouping of some 
of the transactions along the way may disclose other 
lesser or incidental wrongs which could themselves 
have been made the basis of causes of action of a con-
ventional type. In this situation neither of the de-
fendants may require the plaintiff to split the pattern 
of this cases into fragments to be tried as separate 
actions against separate defendants upon raising the 
cry of misjoinder of causes of action and of defend-
ants. (Cases quoted.) 
* * * * * 
The fraud consists in Siegel using his title as a lever 
to exact more from Graham than the interest agreed 
upon and that for such purpose he either took the 
title with a secret intention of so doing, or, after 
taking title for security purposes only, later conceived 
of the scheme to use it for such excess exaction, and 
not succeeding in getting Graham to agree to a modi-
fication of what was a loan agreement he then used 
his title in connivance with Street to divert what was 
in reality Graham-Street equipment charged with a 
loan from that partnership, TO HIS OWN PURPOSE. 
(emphasis ours). 
:1:, * * * * 
Plaintiff wishes to particularly emphasize this next 
quotation from the same argument: 
This is an action in equity to have declared by decree 
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the alleged conduct of Siegel treating himself as 
owner declared as fraudulant; and to make Siegel 
account FOR THE PROPERTY OR THE PRO-
CEEDS THEREOF as Graham-Street partnership 
property and for an accounting AS TO PROFITS 
therefrom while it was controlled by Siegel conniving 
with the allegedly faithless Street. 
(Page 4 of opinion, Rec. 439.) 
It is to be noted here, that in their answers, both de-
fendants denied that any partnership ever existed, (Rec. 
394 and Rec. 404-407.) It was necessary to determine first 
that there was a partnership, what the partnership owned, 
and the status of the parties before any action for the recov-
ery of the property of the partnership could be commenced. 
Between the time of the filing of the original complaint on 
May 13th, 1944, (Rec. 389-391) and the filing of the amend-
ed complaint on April 17th, 1945 (Rec. 396-403) Siegel had 
sold the partnership equipment as his own equipment on 
January 12th, 1945 (Rec. 86). In his original brief, the 
defendant Siegel makes this pertinent statement on page 18: 
But Siegel did not sell partnership equipment. He 
sold his equipment. 
The lower court and this supreme court on appeal found 
that there was a partnership which owned certain assets, 
which included the following: 
In order to show that Graham's interest in the alleg-
ed partnership was at best nominal, it is strenuously 
urged that Graham only contributed $15.00 to the 
venture. He had, however, arranged with the Both-
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
well Construction Company for a purchase of the 
equipment. Granting to Street the right to share 
in that purchase was a contribution. His firm of 
Clyde, Probst and Graham had the entree to jobs. 
They relinquished in favor of Graham. Certainly a 
partnership may be formed between two men to 
operate equipment which they both own, although WI 
mortgaged for the full purchase price. The equity 
in the machine if any and the contract to excavate 
which will yield returns whether the contract is ex-
press, implied or for pay by the unit, is the partner-
ship capital. (Rec. 440). 
This supreme court further found that the partner-
ship owned the following asset: 
That about August 26th Graham and Street went 
down to look over another job of excavating for Garf 
and Nelson and obtained a contract. 
This supreme court, as above set forth, shows that 
Siegel should account for the partnership property or the 
proceeds thereof and for an accounting as to the profits 
therefrom while it was controlled by Siegel conniving with 
the allegedly faithless Street. s~jd accmmting was to be 
made t:-> the partnership. (Emphasis ours). 
As to Street's liability, this court said on page 9 of its 
opinion (Rec. 442): 
In this case Street used property belonging to the 
partnership, treating it as belonging to Siegel, refus-
ing to account to Graham for the moneys collected 
for the use of the tractor, but the property will in 
equity be considered as being used for the benefit 
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profits required to be made to this partnership. 
In passing, it should be noted that the word "profits" 
is not used in the entire Interloculory Decree. In its opinion 
in the mandamus proceeding (Rec. 454) this court held as 
the law of the case: 
When we entertained the appeal from the interlocu-
tory decree we had before us only those matters 
which had been litigated by defendant court. The 
question of what relief Graham was entitled to was 
not before us. Any expressions of opinion by us as 
to what relief Graham was entitled to were mere 
dicta-not the law of the case and not binding either 
upon us or upon defendant court. 
Plaintiff therefore argues that the word "profits" 
should have been stricken from the top of page 10 of its 
opinion (Rec. 442) as well as the words "or of the rental 
value, whichever may be the greater." The statement 
should then read "Equity will nevertheless treat the part-
nership as existing and require an accounting." 
This supreme court in its opinion (Page 4, Rec. 439) 
sets the nature of the cause of action against Siegel as being 
one to make him account "for the partnership property or 
the proceeds thereof as Graham-Street partnership pro-
perty''. 
Section 104-30-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, pro-
vides: 
In an action to recover the possesion of personal pro-
perty, judgment for the plaintiff may be for the 
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possession, OR THE VALUE THEREOF IN CASE 
A DELIVERY CANNOT BE HAD, and damages for 
the detention. (Emphasis ours.) 
In the case of Wasatch Oil Refining Company v. Wade, 
92 Utah, 50, 63 P. 2 1070, this court said: 
Where a case is brought in equity, and the proved 
facts support the allegations of the complaint en-
titling plaintiff to equitable relief, the court having 
obtained juristdiction over the cause will, in the 
execise of its equity jurisdiction, proceed to decide 
the whole issues and award complete relief, although 
the rights of the parties may be strictly legal. That 
is to say, damages will be awarded in substitution 
for or in addition to equitable relief. 
While the action for possession, or the value thereof in ~ 
case a delivery cannot be had, and damages for the deten-
tion, is an action at law, it may b2 settled in this action based 
upon the ruling above quoted. 
In the case of Kunz v. Nelson, et al., 94 U. 185, 76 P.2d 
577, 115 A. L. R. 1322, in .a case for possession of personality 
and damages for its retention, Mr. Just:ce Wolfe discusses 
this class of cases. It states at page 583 of the Pacific Re-
porter: 
A moment's reflection and a glance at the statutes 
on claim and delivery, Rev. St. 1933, 104-16-1 et seq., 
will reveal that claim and delivery is only ancillary 
to an action for possess:on in order to retain or 
obtain possession pending the trying out of the 
rights by the court. While the use of the mechan-
ism of claim and delivery would, if properly ancillary, 
stamp the action as one of replevin and not of con-
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version, the absence of such use cannot stamp a 
possessory action as one for conversion. This action 
must be treated as for possession and not for con-
version. 
In the instant case the judgment should have been 
in the alternative unless it appeared that the hay 
and grain could not be returned or could not be 
returned in substantially the same condition and 
plaintiff was willing to waive possession, in which 
case a judgment for the value only, together with 
interest (use of rental value instead of interest in 
cases where the articles were not trade commodities 
but had particular use of the prevailing part, such 
as workmen's tools), would have been permissible. 
This case is an able discussion of the rules regarding 
possessory actions, and stamps the instant case as set forth 
by the pleadings in the original and amended complaints 
(Rec. 390-303 and 396-403) insofar as it pertains to Siegel, 
as one for possession of the partnership equipment and 
other assets, in favor of the partnership of Graham and 
Street. 
The case of Dolinsky v. Williams, 56 Utah, 186, 189 P. 
873, is a case directly in point on the liability of Siegel. 
Said case holds as follows: 
If the value of the use of the automobile constitutes 
special damages, the allegation in the complaint as 
to damages is clearly insufficient. Special damages 
must be pleaded. It is expressly provided by Comp. 
Laws of Utah 1917, No. 6864, that-
"In an action to recover the possession of personal 
property, judgment for the plaintiff may be for the 
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possession or the value thereof, in case a delivery 
cannot be had, and damages for the detention. If 
the property has been delivered to the plaintiff, and 
the defendant claims a return thereof, judgment for 
the defendant may be for a return of the property, 
or the value thereof, in case a return cannot be had, 
and damages for taking and withholding the same." 
In ·this case the evidence shows that appellant had 
sold the automobile, and respondent was therefore 
entitled to a judgment for the value of the property, 
"not as damages for the conversion, but as a sub-
stitute for and in lieu of the property," and was "in 
addition * * * * entitled to a judgment for damages 
for the taking and withholding" the property. Nahas 
v. Browning (Cal.) 183 Pac. 442. 
And the damages were general, not special. They 
were such damages as necessarily result from taking 
and detaining property, and need, therefore, not be 
specially pleaded. In Farrand & Votey v. M. E. 
Church, 18 Utah, at page 34, 54 Pac. at page 819, the 
court, quoting from 3 Suth. Damages, No. 1144, 
said: 
"Without alleging special injury the plaintiff may 
recover in replevin such damages for the detention 
of the property as the jury, upon all the evidence, 
may be satisfied that its use, considering its nature 
and character, was worth during the time of the 
detention.'' 
It is insisted by appellant that when the value of the 
property is fixed at the time of taking, the loss of use 
should be compensation by allowing the successful 
party in a replevin suit to recover interest on the 
value of the property from the time of taking. Many 
authorities upholding that contention are cited by 
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cerned, the question is settled in Farrand & Votey v. 
M. E. Church, supra, in which the rule stated in 3 
Suth. Damages, No. 1144, is adopted, as follows: 
"Interest on the value will not be adequate compen-
sation, and is not the measure of damages where 
the use of the property detained is valuable. The 
owner is entitled to recover the value of the use if 
he prefers it to interest during the time he was de-
prived of possession." 
The court then says: 
"We are of the opinion that it was not error to allow 
the plaintiff the value of the use of the property 
during its unlawful detention, instead of interest 
on its value." 
If the value of the use of an article exceeds the in-
terest, it is fair and just that the one deprived of 
his property should be paid what the use was reas-
onably worth. This seems to us the better rule. 
The rule as above quoted is held to be the rule in Kunz 
v. Nelson, et al., supra. 
The Supplemental Complaint set up the measure of 
damage for the unlawful and fraudulent detention of the 
assets of the partnership. (Rec. 17-22). It also set up the 
damages for the disruption of the partnership business. 
This was done by the plaintiff to ask for such rental value 
as a substitute for interest or profits or any other compen-
sation for the wrongful detention of the property. At the 
time of the trial, Siegel was still unlawfully detaining this 
property. He held the legal title under the conditional sale 
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contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit I) with Roberts and Ferguson. 
This contract was still in existence at the time of the trial 
(Rec. 324.) 
Inasmuch as this supreme court has required Siegel to 
account for the property or the proceeds thereof as Graham-
Street partnership property, the lower court should have ~ 
required such an accounting. In fact the only way in which uo 
the lower court required Siegel to respond was for damages ~u 
for (1) excluding Graham from the partnership and (2) n11 
ptmitive damages. It was error for the lower court to re-
fuse to require Siegel to account for rental value, such re-
fusal being contrary to the law of the case. 
B 
THE PURPORTED ACCOUNTINGS FILED BY THE 
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE INTERLOCUTORY DECREE ON FILE HEREIN, 
AND ARE CONTRARY TO THE LAW OF THE CASE, 
INASMUCH AS THE DEFENDANT, MAX SIEGEL, WAS 
NOT A PARTNER IN THE PARTNERSHIP OF GRAHAM 
AND STREET AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO DEFEND 
AND ACCOUNT IN TillS ACTION AS A PARTNER, 
AND FOR THE FURTHER REASON THAT BOTH DE-
FENDANTS IN THEIR ORIGINAL ANSWERS AND IN 
THE FIRST TRIAL HEREIN REPUDIATED THE EX-
ISTENCE OF A PARTNERSHIP AND ARE NOW 
ESTOPPED FROM ASKING FOR RELIEF ON THE 
BASIS OF A PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT WHICH 
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THEY BOTH DENIED WAS EVER MADE, AS THE ONLY 
BASIS OF SETTLEMENT HEREIN. 
Siegel mas not a member of the partnership. 
The whole fiction of the defendants in their answers 
to the supplemental complaint which appear in the record at 
pages 44 to 68, is that they are accounting for the opera-
tions of the partnership assets and business, and that said 
business was carried on as originally intended by the part-
ners. 
Siegel states his case (Rec. 46) as follows: 
"That the equipment involved or belonging to the 
said partnership was, during the entire operation of 
said partnership business, used and operated therein, 
and the earnings therefrom received, as, and in 
the manner, contemplated and intended by the part-
ies." 
Street states his case (Rec. 60) as follows: 
"The equipment involved or belonging to the said 
partnership was, during the entire portion of said 
partnership business, used and operated therein and 
the earnings therefrom received as and in the manner 
contemplated and intended by the parties when they 
undertook to form a partnership." 
To these answers, the plaintiff filed motions to strike 
and demurrers which should have been granted and sustain-
ed for the reasons therein set forth and hereinafter shown. 
It was error for the court not to grant the motions and 
sustain the demurrers. 
In the original mandamus proceedings in this supreme 
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court, numbered No. 7045, wherein the defendants sought 
to force the lower court to enter the judgment they desired 
which they stated should be as follows: 
"That the Supreme Court in its opm10n (166 Pac. 
(2) 524), its remand, and in its opinion and ruling 
on rehearing, clearly indicated and required that the 
said District Court should proceed to follow out the 
original decree of the Court, i. e., should proceed to 
_ settle the accounting of the partners (including Sie-
gel as a constructive partner in equity so that he 
might not profit from his wrong) , and should, con-
sequently, as the decree provided, require defendants 
to account for the monies received from the opera-
tion of the partnership assets since August 6, 1943, 
to the date of the decree, and to account for any 
capital assets not sold and retained by defendants 
less costs of equipment purchased, loans paid, and 
operating expenses, and should thereupon, dissolve 
the partnership by decree of Court." 
This supreme court refused to make the temporary 
writ of mandamus permanent, (Rec. 452-455.) It held that 
the measure and extent of the damages or judgment to be 
entered was not before the trial court or the supreme court 
on the appeal. 
The lower court in his memorandum declsion (Rec. 
4 75) based his decision on this premise: 
"A test of the record, in the Court's judgment, justi-
fied the finding that from August 6, 1943 and up to 
December 26, 1944, the use of the partnership assets, 
and the conduct of the partnership business, were 
carried on by Street asslsted by Siegel, with reason-
able diligence, with one exception." 
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The "accountings" of the defendants were based upon 
the following transactions, as recorded on pages 11 and 
12 of BRIEF OF APPELLANT, MAX SIEGEL: 
The accounts from which the accounting were made 
by defendants were kept in a book, Exhibit "N", by 
Mr. Street and his wife (173). The receipts were en-
tered there along with the records of the jobs he was 
employed on, and of his time. Expenses, except some 
out-of-pocket payments (160) paid by him, were 
also entered in this book. Except for such small ex-
pense payments, all receipts were turned over to 
Mr. Siegel who receipted in the book (193), Exhibit 
"N", for them, and all the payments of bills and in-
voices were first checked by Mr. Street (193) and 
paid by the check of Siegel on the "special account" 
kept for this operation. The defendants checked up 
on each other, for their own protection (193), and 
agreed on the payments to be made out of the ac-
count (177). Their respective accounts on the whole 
operation reconciled with each other within $25.20 
(6,53,175). 
In sustaining the defendants in their contention for this 
spurious accounting method, the lower court entirely ig-
nored the replies of the plaintiff to the answers of the de-
fendants found at pages 74 to 78, and pages 110 to 113 of 
the record. These replies were necessary to counteract the 
allegations in the answers of the defendants which should 
have been stricken. They do help to clarify the issues and 
should have been regarded by the lower court. Nearly all 
of the allegations are repetitious of matters which are the 
law of the case, and are rather lengthy. They are not 
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quoted here but show the contentions of the plaintiff rela-
tive to the spurious accountings made by the defendants, 
upon the basis above set forth. By their accountings, they 
are trying to render null and void the rulings of this supreme 
court as to their fraud, and to avoid the consequences of 
the wrongful taking and detaining of the partnership assets 
and business, and withholding it from partnership purposes, 
and appropriating it to their own use. By making the ac-
counts on the basis alleged, the defendants admit that they 
do not intend to account for their fraud, nor for the 
taking and detaining of the partnership assets and business 
by the fraudulent methods which they used. 
Plaintiff cannot find any basis of law or fact in the 
record to sustain this impossible situation. Before such a 
condition could exist the following statements must be 
answered by law and fact: 
How could Siegel insert himself into a partnership on 
August 6th, 1943 when he claimed in his anwer (Rec. 404) 
that the partnership agreement "was not executed or com-
pleted?" 
How could Graham be excluded from a partnership 
which the defendants in their answers said never existed? 
(Rec. 392 and 404). 
How could Street operate equipment belonging to the 
partnership and for its benefit when he claimed in his orig-
inal pleadings and at the first trial that there was no part-
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was renting this equipment from Siegel? 
How can the defendants and the lower court say that 
"On September 3, 1946, the said defendants severally filed 
accounts purporting to set forth the items of account or-
dered by this Court, which accounting correctly reflects all 
of the receipts to the partnership Graham and Street dur-
ing the period between August 6, 1943 and December 26, 
1944, which dates represent the date when the said part-
nership was formed (August 6, 1943) and the date when 
the defendant Street ceased to operate the equipment for 
the purposes originally designed for the partnership (Dec-
ember 26, 1944)", as set forth in Finding 2, (Rec. 115-116), 
when the record shows that all receipts were turned over 
to Max Siegel, who was not a partner, and were not credited 
to the partnership account in a bank as required by the 
Law of the Case (Finding 5, Rec. 82), and especially when 
both defendants claimed there was no partnership, no part-
nership bank account, and that the monies belonged to the 
defendants as the owner and lessee of the equipment? 
How can the defendants and the lower court say that 
the accounts of defendants "correctly reflects all of the ex-
penditures" of the partnership when the Law of the Case 
(Finding 5, Rec. 82) shows that the "checks drawn on funds 
belonging to said partnership were to be signed by both 
partners", and the checks were actually signed by Siegel 
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And finally, how can there be any accounting within 
the partnership of Graham and Street when that partner-
ship has been deprived of its assets and business by the 
fraudulent acts of the defendants, has no money in the bank 
and no winding up of its affairs can be had? 
How can the defendants blow both hot and· cold? 
Before the first trial, the pleadings of both defendants 
showed that they relied entirely on their allegations that 
there was no partnership ever formed, that Siegel purchas-
ed the equipment involved as his own property, operated 
it as the owner, received all of the monies from the opera-
tion, and paid all of the bills in the position of an owner. 
There was no pleading that they were operating the equip-
ment and collecting the proceeds thereof and paying the 
expenditures as partners, and no pleading that they were 
operating the partnership equipment and business as orig-
inally intended by the partners. The contrary appears. 
When the lower court decided these issues and they were 
affirmed by this supreme court on appeal, these matters 
became res adjudicata, the law of the case, and cannot be 
changed. The lower court is without jurisdiction to alter 
this, Silva v. Pickard, supra. 
By their answers to the supplemental complaint shown 
at pages 44 to 58 of the record, the <;Jefendants completely 
reversed themselves and endeavored to litigate matters 
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partnership, and in effect sought to have adjudicated a 
contrary defense to their original defense, to the effect that 
Siegel had inserted himself as a partner and kicked Graham 
out of the partnership, and that Street ran the partnership 
equipment with the assistance of partner Siegel, and all of 
the purposes of the partnership were thus fully carried out, 
and that an accounting should be held between Siegel and 
Street of their operations of the equipment and business as 
the operations of the Graham and Street partnership, and 
that this accounting of their nefarious operations should be 
shoved down the throat of Graham as a complete winding 
up of the affairs of the partnership. 
To the answers referred to~ the plaintiff filed motions to 
strike and demurrers, (Rec. 69-73). The motions, among 
other things, alleged that the answers set up matters con-
trary to the law of the case as determined in the former 
proceedings before this supreme court. The demurrers each 
set up "that all allegations of defense and counterclaim 
therein are res adjudicata." The lower court struck por-
tions of the answers but left in the answers the allegations 
which gave rise to all of the confusion in the lower court. 
It was error for the court to allow these answers at all. 
The court then allowed the defendants to reverse them-
selves and after defending originally on the basis that there 
was no partnership, to now defend on the ground that there 
was a partnership and they were operating it all of the time. 
The findings and decree here appealed from were entered 
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on this new theory. 
This supreme court in the remittitur in the appeal on 
the interlocutory decree, (Rec. 439, page 4, next to last 
paragraph), states: 
This is an action in equity to have declared by decree 
the partnership between Graham and Street; to 
have the alleged conduct of Siegel treating himself 
as owner declared as fraudulent; and to make 
SIEGEL account for that property or the proceeds 
thereof as Graham-Street partnership property and 
for an account as to profits therefrom while it was 
controlled by SIEGEL conniving with the allegedly 
faithless Street. (Emphasis ours). 
This accounting has nothing to do with Street,. as we 
understand it. The accounting is to be made to the partner-
ship of Graham and Street and not to Graham individually. 
Siegel cannot account to Graham individually for Graham-
Street property and surely cannot, under the above ruling, 
account as a partner. 
At the bottom of page 9, (Rec. 442) this supreme court 
says: 
In this case STREET used property belonging to the 
partnership, treating it as belonging to Siegel, re-
fusing to account to Graham for the moneys collected 
for the use of the tractor, but the property will in 
equity be considered as being used for the benefit of 
the Graham-Street partnership and accounting of 
profits required to be made TO THIS PARTNER-
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Section 69-1-18. Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides: 
Every partner must account to the partnership for 
any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits, 
derived by him without the consent of the other 
partners from any transaction connected with the 
formation, conduct or liquidation of the partnership 
or from any use by him of its property. 
The accountings were to be made to the partnership of 
Graham and Street. They were made not to said partner-
ship, but were made as accountings within the partnership 
for the purpose of winding up its affairs. This is untenable. 
The allegation of paragraph 8 of the supplemental com-
plaint (Rec. 19) "That the defendants and each of them, 
for the reasons set forth in paragraphs 6 and 7 hereinabove, 
have failed and refused to account to this court as ordered 
in the interlocutory decree on file herein, and plaintiff all-
eges that they do not intend to do so," must be taken as 
true in the light of the pleadings and arguments of the de-
fendants. 
In summing this part of the argument up, there can be 
no equitable holding that the contentions of the defendants 
are true. Max Siegel was not a partner in the partnership 
of Graham and Street and is not entitled to defend and ac-
count in this action as a partner. Both of the defendants 
are estopped from asking for relief on the basis of a part-
nership agreement which they both denied was ever made, 
as the only basis of settlement herein. 
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POINT II. 
THE PROPER MEASURE OF ACCOUNTING IN 
THIS ACTION IS JUDGMENT FOR THE VALUE OF THE 
EQUIPMENT TAKEN AT THE TIME OF THE TAKING, 
FOR DAMAGES FOR THE VALUE OF THE USE THERE- ili1 
OF, FOR THE VALUE OF THE CONTRACTS OF THE 
PARTNERSIDP APPROPRIATED BY SIEGEL TO HIS 
OWN USE, FOR DAMAGES FOR DISRUPTING THE 
PARTNERSIDP BUSINESS, AND FOR EXEMPLARY 
DAMAGES. 
In their brief on the first appeal on the interlocutory 
decree, the defendants set forth the following: (Brief page 
8) 
The original cause of action was an equitable action 
by one partner seeking an accounting for the part-
nership moneys and property received by the other 
partner. The amended complaint sought to add to 
this as against the defendant Street another cause 
of action for damages for conspiring to take over 
the partnership assets. And in addition, against the 
defendant Siegel for damages for such a conspiracy, 
and also to adjudicate as against the defendant Siegel 
that a contract of purchase which he made with 
Bothwell Construction Company was in fact a con-
tract of a loan to the alleged partnership. We do 
not believe that these matters are all set out in the 
amended complaint, but if we read the court's ruling 
correctly, they are matters upon which the court 
has ruled. 
The defendants cannot say that they were not warned 
that the plaintiff was asking for an accounting for the re-
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turn of the partnership assets and damages for such wrong-
ful taking. The above statement was made by defendants 
before the supplemental complaint (Rec. 17 -22) was filed. 
Finding 11 of the original findings (Rec. 86) which is 
the law of the case, reads as follows: 
11. That from and since August 23rd, 1943, the de-
fendants have conspired to take possession of the 
partnership property of Graham and Street, to collect 
and misappropriate the funds earned in the operation 
of the equipment ON THE CONTRACTS OF GRA-
HAM & STREET, and to exclude plaintiff from any 
management or control of said partnership business, 
and have continued to operate the said partnership 
business, and have continued to operate the said 
partnership equipment and business until January 
12th, 1945, collect all moneys from the operation 
thereof and apropriate said moneys to their own use; 
that on or about the 12th day of January, 1945, the 
said defendant, Max Siegel, with the consent of the 
defendant, Evan E. Street, but without the consent 
or knowledge of the plaintiff, sold all of the partner-
ship equipment hereinabove set forth to Roberts & 
Ferguson of Utah County, Utah, for the sum of Six 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars $$6,500.00). (Em-
phasis ours) . 
Finding 14 (Rec. 87) reads as follows: 
That plaintiff has never relinquished any interest in 
the partnership of Graham & Street, nor the proper-
ty belonging to said partnership, hereinabove set 
forth, and said partnership has never been dissolved 
but is now an existing partnership between the said 
Arthur Graham and Evan E. Street. 
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[ 
Finding 15 (Rec. 87) reads as follows: 
That the note set forth in paragraph 6 above has 
not been paid, and the mortgage set forth in said 
paragraph 6 has never be~n foreclosed. 
Finding 16 (Rec. 87) reads in part: 
That by a sale of the said partnership property, de-
fendants have deprived the partnership of the reason-
able earnings of the partnership property. 
As set forth above in subdivision B of Point I, the de-
fendants did not file any accountings TO the partnership of 
Graham and Street, but filed accountings reflecting their 
dealings between Siegel and Street, padding such accounts 
full of charges for services and expenses of Max Siegel 
and rental due him on equipment which was not leased to nol' 
the partnership, and claimed these accounts were made 
WITHIN the partnership of Graham and Street and were 
accountings within that partnership. (Rec. 6-16). 
The supplemental complaint (Rec. 17-22) set forth the 
spurious nature of the accounts submitted and asked that 
the defendants respond for the rental value alleged in the 
supplemental complaint TO THE PARTNERSHIP OF 
GRAHAM & STREET. 
No new theories were introduced in said supplemental 
complaint which endeavored to change any matter that was 
res adjudicata. The measure and extent of the recovery 
AC 
!. ~ 
which Graham should have was not before the lower court ~~ 
nor considered on the appeal (Rec. 454). This supplemental 
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complaint was made to set up the measure and extent of 
the recovery which Graham should have in the premises. 
This supreme court on the first appeal (Rec. back of 
page 439) held as follows: 
This is an action in equity to have declared by decree 
the partnership between Graham and Street; to have 
the alleged conduct of Siegel treating himself as 
owner declared as fraudulent; and to make Siegel 
account for that property or the proceeds thereof as 
Graham-Street partnership property and for an ac-
counting as to profits therefrom while it was con-
trolled by Siegel conniving with the allegedly faith-
less Street. 
A discussion of the various measures of damage will 
now be discussed: 
A 
THE PROPER MEASURE OF ACCOUNTING IN THIS 
ACTION FOR THE UNLAWFUL TAKING OF THE 
EQUIPMENT BY SIEGEL IS THE VALUE OF THE 
EQUIPMENT TAKEN AT THE TIME OF THE TAKING. 
As shown in the argument under subdivision A of Point 
I, Section 104-30-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provid~s 
the measure in this case. 
Finding 8 of the findings of fact (Rec. 117) finds the 
value of the equipment sold by the defendant, Siegel, to be 
$4,500.00. Plaintiff accepts this value. 
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B 
THE PROPER MEASURE OF ACCOUNTT.NG IN 
THIS ACTION FOR THE DETENTION OF THE EQUIP-
MENT BY THE DEFENDANT, SIEGEL, IS THE RENTAL 
VALUE THEREOF WHILE SO DETAINED BY SIEGEL. 
IR 
na 
This is the point most objected to by the defendants. tjf 
Neither defendant in his brief has questioned the finding 4 
(Rec. 117) as to the rental value of the equipment wrong-
fully appropriated by Siegel to his own purposes. This is set 
at $966 per month. 
The rental value was based upon the expert testimony 
of Walter W. Kershaw, vice president and general manager 
of the Robinson-Kershaw Company, Caterpillar distributors 
for this area. He testified that he knew the caterpillar in-
volved in this action (Rec. 204), and testified as to rental 
values of the equipment involved in this action from pages 
204 to 259 of the record. It was based upon the fact that 
the lessee had to pay all repairs, all costs of operation, and 
return the equipment to the lessor in as good a condition as 
when received. (Rec. 209). (Rec. 247). The rental value 
would be the amount found by the court in said finding 4 
from the time the equipment was purchased in 1943 until 
the time of trial and in fact would bring more at this date 
(Rec. 220). The practice of lessee's paying for the up-
keep of the rented material is still in vogue (Rec. 428). 
Very few tractors purchased prior to 1942 have been com-
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volved in this action was in "normal or fair operating con-
dition" on September 19, 1949 (Rec. 249). 
No pleadings can be found in the answers of defendants 
(Rec. 44-68) which allege that the partnership equipment 
has depreciated or deteriorated in rental value or other-
wise, and no allegations are made that an offer or tender of 
the return of the equipment has been made. 
In the case of Farrand & Votey Organ Co. v. Board of 
Church Extension of Methodist Episcopal Church, 17 Utah, 
467, 18 Utah, 29, 54 Pac. 818, this court said: 
We are of the opinion that it was not error to allow 
plaintiff the value of the use of the property during 
its unlawful detention, instead of interest on its 
value. 
In the case of Dolinsky v. Williams, 56 Utah, 186 P. 837, 
involving an automobile which had been sold during the 
course of the proceedings, this court says: 
So far as this jurisdiction is concerned, the question 
is settled in Farrand & Votey v. M. E. Church, supra, 
in which the rule stated in 3 Suth. Damages, No. 
1144, is adopted, as follows: 
"Interest on the value will not be adequate compen-
sation, and is not the measure of damages where 
the use of the property detained is valuable. The 
owner is entitled to recover the value of the use if 
he prefers it to interest during the time he was de-
prived of possession." 
The court then says: 
"We are of the opinion that it was not error to allow 
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the plaintiff the value of the use of the property 
during its unlawful detention, instead of interest on 
its value." 
If the value of the use of an article exceeds the in-
terest, it is fair and just that the one deprived of his 
property should be paid what the use was reasonably 
worth. This seems to us the better rule. Nahas v. 
Browning, supra; (183 Pac. 442); Hammand v. 
Thompson, 54 Mont. 609, 173 Pac. 229; Tannahill 
v. Lydon, 31 Idaho, 608, 173 Pac. 1146; Tucker v. 
Hagerty, 37 Cal. App. 789, 174 Pac. 908; Hunt v. 
Cohen ( Okl.) 179 Pac. 1; Beck v. Lee, 172 Pac. 686. 
In the case of Rickenberg v. Capitol Garage, 68 Utah, 
30, 249 P. 121, this court said: 
The court awarded respondent as damages the rea-
sonable value of the use of the car during the time it 
was wrongully withheld from him. All courts, so 
far as we know, agree that the reasonable value of 
th use of an automobile for the time it was wrong-
fully detained from the owner constitutes the legal 
measure of damage. Consolidated Nat. Bank v. Cun-
ningham (Ariz.) 238 P. 332; Cook v. Packard Motor 
Car Co., 88 Conn. 592, 92 A. 413, L. R. A. 1915C, 319. 
The case of Kunz v. Nelson, et al, supra, affirms the 
holdings above made. 
The rule then, in this state, is that rental value is sub-
stituted for interest for the time of the wrongful detention. 
These damages are general and can be obtained under the 
prayer for general relief, as follows: 
And the damages were general, not special. They 
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and detaining property, and need, therefore, not 
be specially pleaded, Dolinsky v. Williams, supra. 
Furthermore, in the last quoted case, the automobile 
had been sold and could not be returned. The court allowed 
rental value as damages up to the time of the trial. 
In his memorandum decision (Rec. 475-487) the trial 
court held that the Siegel-Street accounting was an account-
ing within the partnership of Graham and Street and in the 
winding up of the affairs of the partnership in which Gra-
ham was entitled to $2,974.01 (Rec. 483). The Memoran-
dum Decision then goes on: 
However, on January 12, 1945, the defendants ceased 
to hold the partnership property, but sold it, thus 
placing it out of the reach of the plaintiff. In fact 
and in law, the defendants converted the plaintiff's 
interest in the partnership assets at the moment they 
took exclusive control thereof and excluded the plain-
tiff therefrom. The plaintiff from that time was en-
titled to the market value of his interest therein, to-
gether with interest upon such value until the date 
of payment to hjm. Having held that the princples 
of equity, and the rights of the innocent partner, the 
plaintiff herein, are best served by accounting as a 
partnership until sale of the property, to allow plain-
tiff interest for the partnership period would be to 
allow a double recovery to the plaintiff. Thus it is 
ordered that the plaintiff have interest upon the sum 
of $2,974.01 at the legal rate from the 12th day of 
January, 1945 until paid. 
As heretofore set forth several times, this supreme 
court has held that this action is one for an accounting and 
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that Siegel account for the partnership property or the 
proceeds thereof as Graham-Street partnership property ~1u 
(Rec. back of page 439). The action is not for conversion. 
In Kunz v. Nelson, supra, this court said: 
As to the question of whether the court was correct 
after verdict in rendering a judgment for the value 
only, the action being one for possession and not for 
conversion. Originally the common law regarding 
replevin was very strict. It did not permit of obtain-
ing the value of the article withheld, even though it 
transpired that the article had been destroyed and 
could not be returned. This was softened by judicial 
decision or changed by statute. Section 104-30-11, 
R. S. Utah 1933, provides that, "in an action to re-
cover the possession of personal property, judgment 
for the plaintiff may be for the possession, or the 
value thereof in case the delivery cannot be had, and 
damages for the detention." (Italic added.) An ac-
tion for possession cannot ordinarily be transmuted 
into an action of conversion unless both parties treat 
it as such. Even when only the value need be given 
it is not because the nature of the action is changed, 
but because by reason of the fact that the article 
cannot be returned, value is substituted for the pro-
perty. Dolinsky v. Williams, 56 Utah 186, 189 P. 
873. This is because a claimant of property, sincere-
ly believing it to be his, need not run the risk in 
holding it, that he can be compelled to buy it from 
the other in case it is found to be the property of 
the other. 23 R. C. L. 904; Allen v. Fox, 1873, 51 
N. Y. 562, 10 Am. Rep. 641; Dwight v. Enos, 9 N. Y. 
470; Fitzhugh v. Wiman, 9 N. Y. 559. 
It is the law of this case that there was no action for 
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allowed damages for the rental value of the equipment in 
lieu of interest for the unlawful detention, is correct. 
In requiring the accountings in the Interlocutory De-
cree, plaintiff does not at any point set up that he will accept 
as correct these accountings, and in fact the word "profits" 
does not appear in the entire decree. These accountings 
were for information purposes only so that the court could 
settle any accounts between the parties, and so that he 
could make further orders, judgments and decrees to settle 
all differences between and among the parties to end the 
entire controversy existing on the subject matter of the 
action. 
· The court in his Memorandum Decision (Rec. 475) pro-
ceeds to accept the accounts between Siegel and Street as 
correct on the theory that Siegel is a substituted party in the 
partnership of Graham and Street, that Siegel account as 
if he were the partner Graham, that Siegel be allowed all 
of his claims for rental and other things for new equipment 
which he purchased with his own funds but were used in 
partnership business by the partner Siegel and the partner 
Street, and that Siegel could unjustly enrich himself by 
showing that the partner Siegel leased this independent 
property from non-partner Siegel and then transferred this 
burden upon excluded partner Graham, and without any 
fraudulent showing Siegel could force upon Graham as bind-
ing upon Graham all of the items of expense including the 
rental of the conveyor-loader, and after Siegel had so com-
pensated himself, that the accounting of these expenses be 
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considered Graham's acts and that he would be compelled .\U 
to accept partner Siegel's accounting in a partnership which 
Siegel claimed and claims never existed, even though Gra-
ham gave no consent or assent to any such substitution. 
The lower court then proceeds to substitute this accounting 
by partner Siegel for interest during the time Siegel claimed 
he was the owner and no partnership existed from August 
6th, 1943, to January 12th, 1945, when Siegel sold the equip-
ment. The lower court then proceeded to terminate and 
wind up the affairs of the partnership on January 12th, 
1945, even though he had in the Interlocutory Decree de-
creed that the partnership existed on June 15th, 1945. There 
is nothing in the record to show any attempt to dissolve the 
partnership before the entry of the Memorandum Decision 
on May 24th, 1951 (Rec. 487). 
This court has held in J?olinsky v. Williams, supra, 
that "the owner is entitled to recover the value of the use if 
he prefers it to interest during the time he was deprived of 
possession." In the case of Rieken berg v. Capitol Garage, 
supra, this court holds "that the reasonable value of the 
use * * * for the time it was wrongfully detained from the 
owner constitutes the legal measure of damage." In the 
first case, the automobile was held and could not be deliver-
ed. In the last case, a delivery of the automobile could be 
had. 
In the instant case, the equipment was sold by Siegel. 
In any event, he has not made any tender to return the 
equipment and has unlawfully detained the property from 
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August 23rd, 1943, to the present time. 
In the light of the cases quoted, the partnership of 
Graham and Street is entitled to damages against Siegel as 
a substitute for interest during the period of detention, the 
rental value of the equipment detained from the time of the 
taking up to at least the entry of the Memorandum Decision 
of the lower court on May 24th, 1951. 
Furthermore, Siegel and Street do not contend that 
there was a conversion of the property, nor that this su-
preme court so held on the original appeal. Their whole new 
defense is that Siegel is a substituted partner for Graham, 
that faithful performance was made by said substituted 
partner, and that the excluded partner Graham must accept 
partner Siegel's accounting. 
There is an attempt in the briefs of defendants to mini-
mize the damage by showing deterioration of the partnership 
equipment, and by showing that there were certain expenses 
for repairs and the partnership equipment did not make any 
money. There are no pleadl.ngs in their answers on which 
to base such claims. The case of Dolinsky v. Williams, 
supra, holds: 
Counsel call attention to the principle that, if a party 
detaining property did not use same, the deterioration 
which it would have suffered by use as the owner 
would have used it must be deducted from the value 
of the use, and that in this case no deduction was 
made because of deterioration. This issue was not 
raised by defendant's answer. No instruction was re-
quested upon the subject, and in no way is the ques-
50 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tion before us for review. It is apparent that in the 
trial court appellant relied wholly upon his conten-
tion that in replevin when the value of the property 
is fixed at the time of the taking the damages may 
not exceed the interest on such value, and thus rely-
ing upon that theory of the case, counsel logically 
perceived no reason for raising an issue which they 
thought immaterial. 
The Memorandum Decision (Rec. 475) and the subse-
quent Decree (Rec. 122) also minimize Siegel's damage, by 
allowing him to take off one-half of the "partnership" earn-
ings from his accounting. Siegel was not a partner in any 
sense. His accounting should be to the partnership as this 
court ordered and he should respond for the full damage to 
the partnership and be required to pay to the partnership 
rental for the entire period of the detention. Otherwise, he 
will be allowed to profit by his own wrong, Montgomery v. 
Gallas, reported in 225 SW., 557. 
The appellants in their briefs make mention of excess-
ive damages in proportion to the investments made by plain-
tiff. The record shows that plaintiff made all of the invest-
ments in the partnership, that he originally purchased the 
equipment and turned it over to the partnership, that he 
had contracts and good will in a going business which he 
turned over to the partnership, the value of which was diff-
icult to determine. The discussion of these matters will be 
here made. We cite the case of Guerin v. Kirst, 202 P.2d, 
10, as rather controlling in this situation. This is a Califor-
nia case. Said case is quoted as follows: 
l1ll0 
In a replevin action the owner may recover the value , :;n 
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of the use of his property where the amount thereof 
exceeds the interest on such value, inasmuch as the 
latter measure does not furnish adequate compensa-
tion for the wrongful detention. Drinkhouse v. Van 
Ness, 202 Cal. 359, 379, 260 P. 869; Tucker v. Hag-
erty, 37 Cal. App. 789, 792, 174 P. 908. 
The opinion then goes on and states that it is the net 
usable value which should be allowed, and that decline in 
rental value should be considered. During the trial, defend-
ant offered to show proof of these matters of deduction and 
was refused by the lower court. 
However, in that case, the wrongful withholder was an 
innocent purchaser for value. He thought he had actually 
bought the tractor, and he had paid full value therefor. 
There was no fraud involved in any way. 
In this case, as heretofore shown, the lower court com-
puted the rental value after the expense of upkeep had been 
considered, and after decline in rental value of the tractor 
was shown not to exist in this case. Likewise, Siegel appro-
priated this property to his own use through his fraudulent 
manipulations, has made no pleadings which would raise 
these issues, and the record is clear that the rental values 
found by the court take into consideration all of the 
matters listed by the California court in Guirin v. Kirst, 
supra. 
Allegation 11 of the supplemental complaint (Rec. 19) 
alleges that had Graham been allowed to continue in the 
partnership arrangement, the profits therefrom would have 
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exceeded the fair, actual and reasonable rental value of the 
equipment used in the operation of the partnership business. 
Walter W. Kershaw testified that he knew Graham 
well (Rec. 224) that he had observed him for "many hours" ~efi 
in the execution and performance of respective contracts 
(Rec. 229), and for several pages thereafter gives testimony wen 
that such an operator should make in excess of the rental 
value of the equipment. Our allegation 11 is proved. 
c 
THE PROPER MEASURE OF ACCOUNTING rn 
THIS ACTION FOR THE FRAUDULENT APPROPRIA-
TION OF THE PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS BY SIEGEL 
TO HIS OWN USE IS THE TOTAL RECEIPTS RE-
CEIVED BY HIM ON THESE CONTRACTS. 
It goes without saying that the partnership should 
have damages for the wrongful detention of its equipment 
regardless of where the equipment was used, or if the equip-
ment was not used, Dolinsky v. Williams, supra. 
We then come to a discussion of the contracts with 
Ohran Construction Company and Garf & Nelson which 
this court has held were the property of the partnership 
(Rec. 440, last paragraph). The court should have awarded 
damages for the taking of these£g~tt.r,fi~ addition to the 
rental value of the equipment. 
Finding 11 of the original findings (Rec. 86) , which is 
now the law of the case, finds that the only "business" that 
plaintiff is seeking an accounting on is the following: 
"To collect and misappropriate the funds earned in 
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the operation of the equipment on the contracts of 
Graham & Street." 
This is the "business" referred to all the way through 
the findings. Plaintiff has never been after the profits of 
the Siegel-Street operation unless they were in excess of 
the rental value which they were not. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit F shows that the Ohran Construction 
Company paid the sum of $5,327.75 to Siegel upon the Gra-
ham and Street account. Finding 12 of the original find-
ings, (Rec. 86), finds that these funds were the property of 
Graham and Street. 
There are three items in the Accounting of Defendant, 
Evan Street (Rec. 8) which refer to Garf & Nelson, one for 
$307.50, one for $142.50, and one for $42.00, totalling 
$592.00. 
From these figures, Siegel has received $5,919.75 of 
partnership funds on the "business" of the partnership. 
In the replies to the answers of the defendants (Rec. 
74-78 and Rec. 110-114) the plaintiff in no uncertain terms 
sets forth the contention of plaintiff in paragraphs 2 in 
each reply: 
Replying to the last paragraph of paragraph II of 
said Answer, plaintiff denies said paragraph and the 
whole thereof, and alleges that except for the con-
tracts entered into between the partnership of Gra-
ham and Street, and Ohran Construction Company 
on the one part, and Garff and Nielson, on the other 
part, none of the transactions shown in any of the 
accountings filed by the defendants and each of them, 
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and the supplements thereto, are matters and trans-
actions of the partnership of Graham and Street; 
that the plaintiff had no participation in any of said 
matters except as stated, that plaintiff did not join 
in the making of any of the disbursements or sales 
set forth therein, and gave no consent to any of 
the transactions, except for the entering into the two 
contracts herein set forth but not for any disburse-
ments thereunder. That all of said transactions 
other than as above set forth were made by the de-
fendants under their scheme to defraud the partner-
ship of its assets and business to the detriment of the 
plaintiff. 
3. Replying to that part of paragraph III of said 
Answer not stricken by the above entitled court, 
plaintiff denies the allegations therein and the whole 
thereof. Plaintiff further alleges that all of the pro-
ceeds from the operation of the partnership equip-
ment were turned over to and completely handled 
by the defendant, Max Siegel, which was in no man-
ner contemplated and intended by the partners when 
they undertook to form a partnership. Plaintiff fur-
ther alleges that after September 22nd, 1943 the 
whole management of the partnership equipment was 
under the direction of the defendant, Max Siegel, and 
that such management was not contemplated and 
intended by the parties when they undertook to 
form a partnership. 
While these allegations were on matters which 
had been adjudicated, plaintiff made them to clarify his 
stand in this action. This supreme court is invited to read 
all of these replies. If they are completely read, it can be 
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that the plaintiff was seeking to determine what profit had 
been made on the contracts with Ohran Construction Com-
pany and Garff & Nelson. 
Had the defendants' accounts set forth in particularity 
the items required therein instead of failing in many in-
stances to show from whom receipts were received, or to 
whom payments were made and what for, probably a cull-
ing out of the expenses could be made to separate the wheat 
from the chaff. 
Defendants could not segregate their expenses as to the 
above partnership contracts (Rec. 149). 
This being so, the defendants should account to the 
partnership for the $5,919.75 in money of the partnership 
which they have received. 
In the case of Royer v. Dobbins, (Oklahoma) 239 P. 
157, it is said: 
All of the expenses claimed by the defendants were 
incurred after he had repudiated the trust relation, 
and it would not have been error for the court to 
have disallowed the entire claim. Hobbs v. McLean, 
117 U. S. 567, 6 S. Ct. 870, 29 L. Ed. 940; Somerset 
Ry. v. Pierce, 98 Me. 528, 57 A. 888; Hanna v. Clark, 
204 Pa. 145, 53 A. 757; Pollard v. Lathrop, 12 Colo., 
171, 20 P. 251; Snow v. Hazelwood, 179 F. 182, 102 
C. C. A. 448; Lehman v. Rothbarth, 159 Ill. 270, 42 
N. E. 777; Stone v. Farnham, 22 R.I. 225, 47 A. 211; 
Fuller v. Abbe, 105 Wis. 235, 81 N. W. 401; Cook v. 
Lowry, 95 N. Y. 103. 
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l 
D. 
THE DEFENDANTS SHOULD ACCOUNT TO THE 
PARTNERSHIP FOR DAMAGES CAUSED FOR DISRUP-
TING THE PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS. 
In paragraph C above, it is shown that at least $5,919.75 
was received by the defendant Siegel from contracts belong-
ing to Graham and Street. It is to be noted in passing that 
the check No. 870 of the Ohran Construction Co., (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit G) is not accounted for in either of the accountings 
of the defendants (Rec. 6 to 16). 
The total receipts reflected were $17,934.53 accordin~ 
to the accountings (Rec. 66). The receipts from partner-
ship contracts were 33% of this total. The time required to 
perform these contracts according to the accounts was not 
in excess of 20% of the total time of operation. In other 
words, these were the good contracts and showed the influ-
ence of Graham's management. The good will of this going 
DWl 
business should be at least the $5,000 allowed by the court :nu.· 
as compensatory damages for the reasons set forth by the 
court. 
In Johnson Oil Refining Co. of Dlinois et al. v. Elledge, 
(Oklahoma), 53 P. (2d), 543, the court says: 
The loss of profits proximately resulting from the 
destruction of an established business constitutes an 
element of damages recoverable for such destruction. 
Wellington v. Spencer, 37 Okl. 461, 132 P. 675, 46 L. 
R.A. (N. S.) 469. It has also been held that uncer-
tainty as to the amount of damages does not prevent 
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recovery, and, where it clearly appears that loss of 
profits to a business has been suffered, it is proper 
to let the jury determine what the loss probably was 
from the best evidence the nature of the case admit-
ted. Bishop-Babcock-Becker Co. v. Estes Drug Co., 
63 Okl. 117, 163 P. 276. See, also Ft. Smith & W. R. 
Co. v. Williams, 30 Okl. 726, 121 P. 275, 40 L.R.A. 
(N. S.) 494; Wellington v. Spencer, supra; Paolo Gas 
Co. v Paola Glass Co., 56 Kan. 614, 622, 44 P. 621, 
54 Am. St. Rep. 598; McGinnis v. Studebaker Corpor-
ation of America, 75 Or. 519, 146 P. 825, 147 P. 525, 
L.R.A. 1916B, 868, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1190, Border 
City Ice & Coal Co. v. Adams, 69 Ark. 219, 62 S. W. 
591; Anvil Mining Co. v. Humble et. al, 153 U. S. 
540, 14 S. Ct. 876, 38 L. Ed. 814. 
E. 
THE PARTNERSHIP SHOULD BE ALLOWED EX-
EMPLARY DAMAGES FOR THE FRAUD OF THE DE-
FENDANTS. 
In Haycraft v. Adams, 82 Utah, 347, 24 Pac. 2 (d), 
1110, the following rule is set forth: 
"Exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages are such 
damages as are in excess of the actual loss, and are 
allowed where a tort is aggravated by evil motives, 
actual malice, deliberate violence, oppression or 
fraud" Murphy v. Booth, 36 Utah, 285, 103 P. 768, 
770. 
This supreme court has held Siegel and Street guilty 
of fraud. In their briefs on this appeal they are trying to 
minimize the exemplary damages allowed by the lower 
court by showing that such damages cannot be allowed in 
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-----, 
the dissolution of a partnership. We have not arrived at 
the time when the partnership can be dissolved. Siegel, who 
is not a partner, is still retaining title to the equipment of 
the partnership under his contract of sale with Roberts and 
Ferguson. (Plaintiff's Exhibit I.) He is still holding 
$8,318.22 in the Continental National Bank and Trust Com-
pany (Plaintiff's Exhibit Q) which is from the operation 
of the Siegel-Street owner-lease agreement. He has not 
tendered this property back to the partnership, and if he 
were sincere in his claim that he substituted himself for 
Graham in the partnership of Graham and Street, he would 
put this money in the account of Graham and Street as the 
partners originally intended. Until an accounting is made "~1TI 
to the partnership of Graham and Street, there can be no 
accounting within the partnership as there is nothing in 
the partnership to wind up and terminate. 
The award of $5,000.00 as punitive damages is not ex-
cessive in view of the considerable damage that Siegel and 
Street have fraudulently imposed upon the partnership of 
Graham and Street, and in particular, Arthur Graham. 
POINT III. 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO 
ALLOW MAX SIEGEL RENTAL FOR THE CONVEYOR-
LOADER. 
In the memorandum decision of the lower court (Rec. 
480), it is stated: 
The evidence is not clear as to the date when Siegel's 
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conveyor-loader came onto the job, or into Street's 
hands, but Siegel received the Bill of Sale from Sump-
sian in an envelope post-marked October 6, 1943. 
The Court feels justified in assuming that Street had, 
and used it from that time until the end of partner-
ship operations on December 26, 1944. Plaintiff ad-
mits that the reasonable rental value of this piece 
of equipment was $170.00 per month, and the Court 
finds that that rate was the standard under the 
Office of Price Administration Regulations in effect 
at the time. Thus for the fifteen months it was 
used, Siegel is entitled to credit in the sum of 
$2,550.00 as rental for the conveyor-loader, instead 
of the $2,720.00 claimed by him. 
This is strange doctrine. In an action for accounting 
wherein Graham is the innocent party who is suffering loss, 
he is not allowed rental value on the equipment taken from 
him, and this fraudulently, but is required to pay rental 
value in the termination of the affairs of a partnership 
from which he was excluded, to the fraudulently-inserted-
partner Siegel, for equipment purchased by Siegel after 
Graham was excluded from the partnership. Is this equity? 
In paragraph 4 of the reply to Siegel's answer (Rec. 
75), plaintiff alleged: 
4. Replying to paragraph IV of said Answer not 
stricken by the above entitled court, plaintiff denies 
the allegations of said paragraph and the whole 
thereof. Plaintiff alleges that the defendant Siegel 
received in excess of the amounts paid for the addi-
tional equipment set forth in paragraph as men-
tioned in said Answer, from the Ohran Construction 
Company on contracts entered into between the part-
nership of Graham and Street and the said Ohran 
Construction Company; that said additional equ·p-
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ment was purchased for the purpose of completing 
the contracts with the said Ohran Construction Com-
pany, which contracts the defendant Siegel fraudu-
lently appropriated to his own use before the pur-
chase of said additional equipment; and that said 
Siegel purchased such additional equipment out of 
the funds fraudulently appropriated by him from 
the proceeds of contracts belonging to the partner-
ship of Graham and Street. Plaintiff further alleges 
that he had no knowledge of any lease by the part-
nership of Graham and Street whereby such partner-
ship was to lease such additional equipment from the 
defendant Siegel, and further alleges that any such 
lease arrangement entered into without the consent 
of this plaintiff was contrary to the partnership 
agreement. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit F shows that Siegel had received 
$2,095.25 on the Ohran Construction Company contract be-
fore the end of the year 1943. The new equipment, includ-
ing the conveyor-loader and truck, were purchased for 
$2,000.00. 
In carefully checking the law, plaintiff has found that 
in order to recover the possession or the value of property 
under an action of this kind, plaintiff must prove title. This 
cannot be done as to the conveyor-loader, and so any claim 
for rentals from that piece of equipment as partnership 
equipment, will have to be decided against the plaintiff. 
However, Siegel should not be given rental value for 
his use of this equipment. There is no theory in fact or 
law which will allow Siegel rental value from a partnership 
which he claimed did not exist. He never made a claim for 
rental value of this equipment in his original pleadings (Rec. 
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404-406) or that it was leased to the partnership of Graham 
and Street. In fact, his answer was that there was no part-
nership of Graham and Street, so how could he rent his 
conveyor-loader to the partnership of Graham and Street? 
FUrthermore, there is nothing in the record to show that 
Graham ever participated in any such lease. 
The defendants have gladly welcomed the granting of 
rental value to them, and have accepted the amount of that 
rental value gladly and with open arms. Can they now be 
heard to complain if rental value is charged against them 
in the accounting to the partnership of Graham and Street 
which they have not yet made? 
IV. 
THE PLAINTIFF PROVED ALL OF THE ALLEGA-
TIONS OF HIS SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT AND 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN A WARDED JUDGMENT IN AC-
CORDANCE THEREWITH. 
With the exception of paragraph 12 of the supplement-
al complaint (Rec. 17) and deducting rental value on the 
conveyor loader and pickup truck, the allegations of plain-
tiff's complaint were fully proven as has been hereinbefore 
set forth. 
From the argument heretofore made, findings 2, 3, 6, 
7, 9, 21, and that part of finding 25 except compensatory 
damages and punitive damages, are all contrary to the 
law of the case and the facts found in paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 
8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and24. 
(Rec. 115-121,). The Decree based on said findings is 
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__ [ __ _ 
erroneous except as to the compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. 
v. 
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE 
MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE APPEAL 
FROM THE INTERLOCUTORY DECREE HERETOFORE 
ENTERED HEREIN THAT THE DEFENDANTS SHOULD 
NOT BE ALLOWED ·TO PROFIT FROM THEIR OWN 
WRONG. 
It goes without saying, that Siegel is profiting by his 
own wrong in the Decree (Rec. 115-122) in following par-
ticulars: 
( 1) He is allowed to take rental value on the conveyor 
loader which was claimed in the original action to be h~s 
own property operated by himself on his own contracts. 
He denied the existence of the partnership and could not 
rent it to the partnership. 
(2) In his accounting, he was allowed to deduct the 
one-half interest owned by Street from his accounting. 
(3) He was not required to account for the detention 
of the partnership equipment nor the proceeds of the part-
nership contracts which he appropriated to his own use. 
Insofar as Street was concerned, he was allowed to 
have one-half of the proceeds of the partnership of Graham 
and Street which he repudiate<J and which he said did not 
exist, and this is allowing him to profit by his own wrong. 
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to operate the equipment as Siegel's property. As a joint 
tort-feasor with Siegel he was not required to account for 
the detention of the partnership equipment nor the proceeds 
of the partnership contracts which were appropriated by 
Siegel to his own use. 
VI. 
THE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON JULY 12TH, 1952, 
HEREIN DOES NOT MAKE THE PLAINTIFF, GRA-
HAM, WHOLE. 
The judgment would give Graham approximately 
$14,000.00 for eight years of being deprived of his assets 
and business. This is less than $2,000.00 per year. By their 
own accountings after paying Street wages, the Siegel-
Street operation made $7,139.77 (Rec. 482), in 17 months. 
This would amount to $5240 per year. From the fact that 
the contracts which Graham turned over to the partnership 
were 33% of the total business transacted, and that this was 
done in 20% of the time, there is no telling what amount of 
business could have been accomplished under Graham's 
management. 
Then again, the business could have grown as it was 
growing under Graham's supervision before the entry of 
Street into a partnership agreement with Graham, and 
while this is speculative, it is reasonable to assume from 
the opinion of this court (Rec. 438) that because of the 
scarcity of equipment (which still exists) that a consider-
able business could have been built up if Street had remain-
ed faithful to Graham. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the premise used by 
the defendants in both of their briefs that this action is 
only for a partnership accounting, and that the self-injected 
partner, Siegel, is herein accounting in the place of the 
ejected partner, Graham, has failed, and that the lower 
court in following this premise has done so contrary to and 
not in compliance with the law of the case heretofore es-
tablished in the appeal from the Interlocutory Decree and 
the Mandamus proceeding heretofore decided by this court. 
The accountings should be settled on the basis set 
forth by the plaintiff in this brief to do substantial justice 
and to prevent the defendants from profiting by their own 
wrongs. That by so doing, neither defendant will be pen-
alized and the plaintiff will not be unjustly enriched. 
The accountings of the two defendants should first be 
made to the partnership of Graham and Street. After th.is 
is done, and the accounts are settled and paid, the partner-
ship will have something to distribute in a partership ac-
counting to wind up its affairs. 
The defendant, Siegel, the guiding light of Street in 
this case, appears to be using Street as a tool to further his 
fraudulent machinations, and if Street is allowed any credit 
for being a partner, it is apparent that Siegel will use these 
credits for his own purposes as he has used the partnership 
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All of the evidence that can be produced is now before 
this supreme court. It has original equity jurisdiction. If 
this court does not desire to exercise this original equity 
jurisdiction, plaintiff does not feel that it will sustain the 
lower court in going contrary to the law of the case. If 
such is the case, this supreme court should in no uncertain 
terms instruct the lower court what to do so that this case 
can be wound up with dispatch. 
Plaintiff submits this brief with confidence that he 
will receive equity. 
Respectfully submitted, 
66 
GEORGE B. STANLEY 
DAVID L. McKAY 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Arthur Graham. 
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